The matter of Savage v Savage [2023] QSC 280 provides a significant illustration of how public policy shapes succession law, particularly through the forfeiture rule. The matter arose after Edward Erle Savage was murdered by his daughter, Gail Marie Beazleigh, in 2000. This tragic situation created a complex legal question: Could Beazleigh’s children inherit her share of the estate notwithstanding her crime?
The forfeiture rule, which the court carefully explained, embodies a fundamental public policy principle: no person can obtain or enforce rights resulting from their own crime. As quoted in the judgement, Sir Samuel Evans captured the moral foundation of this rule by stating that “the human mind revolts at the very idea that any other doctrine could be possible in our system of jurisprudence.” This principle automatically prevented Beazleigh from inheriting due to her murder conviction.
The matter is particularly instructive because it demonstrates how courts handle attempts to circumvent the forfeiture rule’s harsh effects on innocent third parties (in this matter, the murderer’s children). The deceased’s will contained a “gift over” provision stating that if any child predeceased him, their share would pass to their children. This created three potential legal pathways to allow the murderer’s children to inherit, each of which the court rejected for important public policy reasons:
The Rule in Jones v Westcomb Approach:
This rule allows courts to interpret gift over provisions as applying to events other than those specifically mentioned. However, the court emphasised that this flexibility only extends to situations where the testator “must a fortiori have intended” the alternative outcome. The court powerfully reasoned that it could not possibly find that a testator would have intended their murderer’s children to inherit, as this would indirectly benefit the wrongdoer’s family line notwithstanding the crime.
The “Fiction” Approach:
Some previous matters had treated murderers as if they had died before their victims to trigger gift over provisions. The court rejected this approach as “problematic in principle,” highlighting how legal fictions should not be used to circumvent clear public policy rules.
The Constructive Trust Approach:
Whilst some courts had previously used constructive trusts to “avoid unconscionability,” this approach was rejected because it contradicts the forfeiture rule’s core purpose. The court noted this method “sits uncomfortably with the core public policy underscoring the forfeiture rule, which by definition assumes that the killer takes nothing.”
The court’s decision to distribute Beazleigh’s forfeited share amongst the other beneficiaries (one-half to her surviving brother and one-quarter each to her deceased brother’s children) reinforces several public policy principles:
The absolute nature of the forfeiture rule
The importance of clear testamentary interpretation
The rejection of legal mechanisms that might indirectly benefit those who commit crimes against testators
The principle that courts should not rewrite wills based on presumed intentions
This matter serves as a stark reminder that public policy in succession law prioritises deterring wrongful behaviour over protecting the interests of innocent relatives of wrongdoers. It also demonstrates how courts carefully balance competing principles: the desire to fulfil testamentary wishes against the need to uphold fundamental public policy rules.
The judgement reinforces that whilst the consequences of the forfeiture rule might seem harsh to innocent third parties (like the murderer’s children), this harshness is necessary to maintain the integrity of the legal system’s response to serious wrongdoing. As the court noted, even though the contingency of murder is not one “for which a testator can decently provide in his will,” this does not justify courts implying intentions without a sound basis.